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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper uses income tax returndata from 1960 to 2000 toanalyze the
link between reported incomesand marginal tax rates. Only the top1 per-
cent of income earnersshow evidence of behavioral responsesto taxation.
The data display strikingheterogeneity in the size of responsesto tax
changes over time, with no responseeither short-term or long-termfor
the very large Kennedy top incometax cuts in the early 1960s,and strik-
ing evidence of responses,at least in the short term, tothe tax changes
since the 1980s. The 1980s taxcuts generated a surge inbusiness income
reported by high-incomeindividual taxpayers, due to a shift awayfrom
the corporate sector, andthe disappearance of businesslosses for tax
avoidance. The Tax Reform Actof 1986 and the recent 1993 taxincrease
generated large short-term responsesof wages and salaries reportedby
top income earners mostlikely because of retiming incompensation to
take advantage of the tax changes.It is unlikely, however, thatthe extraor-
dinary trend upward of theshares of total wages accruing totop wage
income earners, whichstarted in the 1970s andaccelerated in the 1980s
and especially the late 1990s, canbe explained solely by the evolutionof
marginal tax rates.
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TA)(SIM calculator. I thank AlanAuerbach, Gerald Auten, Robert Carroll,Dan Feenberg,
Martin Feldstein, WojciechKopczuk, Andrew Leigh, Thomas Pil'zetty,James Poterba, and
especially Joel Slemrod for very helpfulcomments and discussions. Financial supportfrom
the Sloan Foundation and NSFGrant SES-0134946 is gratefullyacknowledged.118Saez
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last 40 years, the U.S. federalincome tax system has undergone
large changes. Perhaps the most strikingchange has been the dramatic
decrease in top marginal incometax rates. From 1950 to the early 1960s,
the statutory top marginal incometax rate was 91 percent. This ratewas
reduced to 70 percent by the Kennedytax cuts in the mid-1960s. During
the Reagan administrations of the1980s, the top income tax ratewas fur-
ther reduced to 50 percent in 1982 bythe Economic and Recovery TaxAct
(ERTA) of 1981, and was reducedagain to 28 percent in 1988 by theTax
Reform Act (TRA) of 1986. Thetop income tax rate was then increasedto
31 percent in 1991 and furtherto 39.6 percent in 1993 by the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of1993. The top rate has been reduced
to 35 percent in 2003 by the 2001 taxreform. Only about 500 taxpayers
were subject to the top marginal tax rate of 91percent in the early 1960s,
but by 2000, more than halfa million taxpayers were subject to the top
rate.1 Thus, the continuous and drasticprogressivity of the federal income
tax system up to the very highest incometaxpayers has been replaced by
a much flatter tax structure, where anupper-middle-class family can face
the same marginal tax rateas the highest-income earners in the United
States.
In addition to the redistributiveeffects, the dramatic reductions intop
income tax rates might havegenerated large behavioralresponses: the
net-of-tax value of an additional dollarof pretax income (excludingstate
and local taxes) for those in the highestincome bracket has experienced
enormous variations over the period, from lessthan $0.10 in the early
1960s to more than $0.70 by the late1980s and around $0.60 by 2000. Itis
plausible to think that such variationsmight have had substantial effects
on the economic activity of high-incomeearners, such as labor supply
decisions, career choices, and savingsdecisions, as well ason the form
of compensation (salaryversus untaxed fringe benefits, for example).
Indeed, the intellectual weight behindthe dramatic reduction in marginal
income tax rates in the 1980swas the logic of supply-side economics,
which argued that lower tax rateswould generate important increasesin
economic activity and perhapseven tax revenues. As documented by
Feenberg and Poterba (1993, 2000) andPiketty and Saez (2003), there has
indeed been an extraordinary increasein the share of total incomeac-
cruing to upper-income groups in theincome distributionover the last
25 years. For example, the income shareof the top 1 percent oftaxpayers
1The statistics on the number of taxpayersin each tax bracket have been reported regularly
since 1961 in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)annual publication Statistics of Income.Reported Incomes and Marginal TaxRates, 1960-2000119
(excluding capital gains fromthe analysis) has surged fromless than
8 percent in the early1970s to almost 17 percent in2000 (Piketty and Saez,
2003). Feenberg and Poterba(1993) pointed out that the timingof the
increase in top incomeshares, and most notably the surgein top income
from 1986 to 1988 aroundTRA of 1986, appears to beclosely related to the
cuts in top income tax rates.Slemrod and Bakija (2001) andPiketty and
Saez (2003) note, however,that the surge in top incomesaccelerated in the
late 1990s, although top incometax rates increasedsubstantially in 1993.
The goal of this paper is tounderstand the effects ofmarginal income
tax rates on reportedincomes by analyzing theshares and composition of
incomes accruing to various groupsin the top tail of the incomedistribu-
tion, and the marginal incometax rates faced by those groups.The analy-
sis will focus on the1960-2000 period because it spansall the important
tax changes sinceWorld War IL2 This sameperiod allows me to use the
large and stratified public-usetax return microfilesreleased by the IRS
since 1960, as well as theTA)(SIM tax calculator createdand maintained
by the National Bureauof Economic Research (NBER) toestimate mar-
ginal and average tax rates.3
Many researchers havetried to estimate the effects of taxes ondecisions
such as those involving thelabor supply, savings, andretirement. Over
the past decade, researchershave pointed out that thesestandard behav-
ioral responses are only componentsof what drives reported incomes;
other responses (such as theform of compensation,tax-deductible activi-
ties, unmeasured effort,and compliance) also ultimatelydetermine
reported incomes, and these responsesmay be more elasticwith respect
to taxation. Feldstein(1999) shows that, under certainconditions, the
overall elasticity of taxable incomewith respect to the net-of-tax rate
(1 minus the marginal taxrate) is relevant for assessing theimplications
of tax changes for revenueraising and welfare. Theinfluential studies of
Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein(1995), which examined the1980s tax cuts,
estimated very large elasticities,in excess of 1. This strikingconclusion
has generated a substantialbody of work on this centralelasticity param-
eter and generated awide range of estimatedelasticities, ranging from
Feldstein's (1995) and Lindsey's(1987) separate estimates atthe high end
to close to zero at thelow end, depending on theestimation methodology
and the tax reforms considered.4
2There are few studies onbehavioral responses to taxation in theUnited States in the pre-
war era. Goolsbee (1999)provides a simple analysis of the mostimportant episodes.
See Feenberg arid Coutts (1993)for a description of the TAXSIMcalculator.
See Gruber and Saez (2002)for a survey.120Saez
It is important to note that, incontrast to most previous studies,my
analysis focuses on reported incomesbefore deductions, suchas adjust-
ments to gross income, personalexemptions, and standard and itemized
deductions. Therefore,my income concept is market income rather than
taxable income. Because taxableincome is a smaller base thangross income, and becausesome components of deductions suchas charitable giving or mortgage interestdeductions are also responsive tomarginal
tax rates, the elasticities of taxableincome are likely to be larger thanthe
elasticities of reported incomes thatI analyze here.5
My analysis shows that only thereported incomes of taxpayers within
the top 1 percent of the incomedistribution appear to beresponsive to changes in tax rates over the1960-2000 period. Even upper-middle-
income taxpayers (within the top decilebut below the top 1 percent), who
experienced substantial changes in marginaltax rates, show no evidence
of responses to taxation, eitherin the short-run or the long-run.
Attributing all the gains of the top1 percent relative to theaverage to the
changes in tax rates produces largeelasticities of income withrespect to
net-of-tax rates, in excess of 1. However,allowing for simple secular and
non-tax-related time trends in the top incomeshare reduces the elasticity
drastically (to about 0.5). Top incomeshares within the top 1percent show
striking evidence of large andimmediate responses to the taxcuts of the
1980s, and the size of thoseresponses is largest for the topmost income
groups. In contrast, top incomes displayno evidence of short- or long-
term response to the extremely largechanges in the net-of-taxrates fol-
lowing the Kennedy tax cutsin the early 1960s.
Data on the composition of incomeshow that part of theresponse to the
1980s tax cuts has been due toa sudden and permanent shift ofcorporate income toward the individual incomesector using partnerships and
Subchapter S corporations, legalentities taxed only at the individual
level. However, most of thesurge in top incomes since the 1970s has been
due to a smooth and extraordinaryincrease in the wages and salarycom-
ponent (which includes stock-optionexercises). This wage incomesurge
started slowly in the early 1970s and hasaccelerated over the period, and
especially during the last decade, and doesnot seem to be closely related
to the timing of the tax cuts. There isevidence of short-termresponses of
the wage income component aroundTEA 1986 and OBRA 1993: topwage
Gruber and Saez (2002) indeed find larger elasticitiesfor taxable income than for adjusted
gross income. Here, I focus on gross income because thenature and size of deductions has changed considerably over timeso that, in contrast to gross income, it is not possibleto con- struct consistent time series of taxable income. Alarge part of the literature has analyzedthe response of the main components of itemized deductionssuch as charitable contributions and interest deductions.Reported Incomes and MarginalTax Rates, 1960-2000121
income shares spike justafter the tax reduction of1986 and just before the
tax increase of 1993,suggesting that highly paidemployees were able to
retime their compensation totake advantage of the taxchanges. It is dif-
ficult, however, to tell apart along-term effect of tax cutsfrom a non-tax-
related secular widening of thedisparity of earnings.
The paper is organized asfollows. Section 2 describesthe key identifi-
cation issues in estimatingbehavioral elasticities of incomewith respect
to marginal tax ratesand shows how such elasticityestimates can be used
for tax policy analysis.Section 3 presents the results onincome shares and
marginal tax rates, as well asthe evolution of thecomposition of top
incomes. Section 4concludes by contrasting the U.S.experience with evi-




The economic modelunderlying the estimation ofbehavioral responses to
income taxation is asimple extension of the staticlabor supply model.
Individuals maximize autility function u(c, z)increasing in after-tax
income c (available, forexample, for consumption)and decreasing in before-
tax income z (earningincome is costly, forexample). The budget con-
straint takes the form c(1 - t) z + R, where r is themarginal tax rate and
R is virtual income.Such maximization generates anindividual "reported
income" function of z(1 - 'c, R)which depends on the net-of-taxrate 1 -
and virtual income R.6Each individual has aparticular income supply
function reflecting his orher skills, taste for labor, etc.Income effects are
ignored, so the income function zis independent of Rand depends only
on the net-of-taxrate.7 The key point is that, incontrast to the standard
labor supply model, changesin hours of work isn'tthe only factor that
can affect earnings z;intensity of work on the job, careerchoices, form of
compensation, tax-deductibleactivities, etc., can also affectearnings. The
analysis below will showthat it is indeed the full responseof reported
incomes that is relevantfor tax policy (a point madeby Feldstein, 1999).
The literature on behavioral responsesto taxation hasattempted to use
tax reforms toidentify the elasticity ofreported incomes with respect to
6This reported income supplyfunction remains valid in the caseof nonlinear tax schedules;
c = (1 -z + R then representsthe linearized budget constraint atthe utility maximizing
point.
Labor supply studies in generalestimate modest income effects. SeeBlundell and Macurdy
(1999) for a survey. Gruberand Saez (2002) try to estimateboth income and substitution
effects in the case of reported incomesand find small and insignificantincome effects.122Saez
the net-of-tax rate definedas e = [(1 - 't)/z] z/(1- 'r) in the notation used
above. To isolate the effects ofthe net-of-tax rate,one compares observed
reported incomes after the taxrate change to the incomes thatwould have been reported had thetax change not taken place. Obviously,the latter are not observed and must beestimated. The simplest methodconsists in using as proxy reported incomesbefore the reform, and hencein relating changes in reported incomes beforeand after the reform to changesin tax rates.
Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein(1995) applied this methodologyto the ERTA 1981 and TRA 1986tax changes and found thattop income groups,
which experienced the largestmarginal tax cuts, alsoexperienced the largest gains in reportedincomes. As a result, Lindsey(1987) and Feldstein (1995) obtainextremely large elasticities, between1 and 3, with preferred estimates around1.5. Several important issuessurround those estimates.
First, as pointed out by Slemrod(1996, 1998) and Goolsbee(2000a), these elasticitiesare upward biased if, fornon-tax-related reasons, top
incomes increased more rapidlythan average incomes duringthat period. A large body of work hassuggested that nontax factors,such as skill- biased technicalprogress, the development of internationaltrade, or the decline of unions, might haveled to a substantial increasein earnings dis- parity in the 1980s [see Katz andAutor (1999) for a surveyj. Toovercome this issue, it would bepreferable to comparetaxpayers with similar incomes rather than comparinghigh incomes to middleincomes. In the case of income taxation, this approachis difficult for tworeasons. First, for most reforms,taxpayers with similar incomes facevery similar tax changes.8 Second, althoughthe discontinuity in marginaltax rates due to the progressive bracketstructure creates sharp changesin marginal incen- tives for taxpayers withvery similar incomes, this situationcannot be sat- isfactorily exploited toestimate elasticities becauseit appears that
taxpayers either control theirincomes imperfectly orare not well aware of
the details of the tax code andtheir precise locationon the tax schedule.9'1°
Therefore, it is conceivable thatonly large or salient tax changesare likely to generate behavioralresponses, which raises some interestingand
8In contrast, for redist-ributiveprograms (such as the Earned Income TaxCredit, which is targeted to taxpayers with children)taxpayers with no children but similarincome can be used as a plausibly better controlgroup for identifying the effects of theprogram (see, for example, Eissa and Liebman, 1996).
In an earlier study (Saez, 2003), Itried to exploit this feature and thebracket creep from 1979 to 1981 to identify behavioralresponses.
10In an earlier study (Saez, 2002), 1 documentedin detail the fact that bunching,as predicted by theory, does not occur at the kinkpoints of the tax schedule.Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates,1960-2000123
complicated issues about the estimationof behavioral responses and the
design of tax policy [see Liebmanand Zeckhauser (2003) for ananalysis
along these lines].
Second, comparing years just beforeand just after the reform might
reveal a short-term elasticity. which canbe quite different from the long-
term elasticity, the relevantparameter for tax policy. Slemrod(1995) dis-
cusses this point,and Goolsbee (2000b) showsconvincingly that
executives exercised numerousstock options in 1992 to avoid thehigher
tax rate starting in 1993,which created a large short-term elasticityof
reported income around OBRA 1993; thelonger-term elasticity was much
smaller and possibly equal to zero.11Looking at times series spanning sev-
eral years before and after thereform, as in Feenberg and Poterba(1993),
can be helpful. formaking progress on these two issues.Slemrod (1996)
proposes an aggregatetime-series regression framework,for the period
1954 to 1990, to try and disentangle taxand nontax influences on the share
and composition of income accruing tothe top 0.5 percent taxpayers.
Third, the Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein(1995) studies assume implicitly
that reported income elasticities arethe same for all income groupsand,
as we will see, thedata strongly suggest that those taxpayerswith very
high incomes are much moreresponsive to changes in taxation than tax-
payers in the middle orupper-middle class. More precisely, insteadof adopt-
ing the simple differencemethod just described, they comparechanges in
the incomes of the very high incomes(experiencing the largest tax rate
changes), to changes in incomes ofthe middle and upper-middle class (expe-
riencing more modest taxchanges). This difference-in-differencesof (log)
incomes is then divided by thecorresponding difference-in-differences of
(log) net-of-tax rates to obtain anelasticity estimate of the followingform:
g(H)_AiOg(ZM)
-
where zH, zM and tH,tM denote the incomes and marginal tax ratesof the
high (H) and middle (M) income groups,respectively, and A denotes the
changes from before to after the taxchange. But suppose that the middle
class has a zero elasticity, so that Alog(zM) = 0, and that high-income indi-
viduals have an elasticity of e, so thatA log(zH) = eAlog(1 -cH). Assume
further that the middle class experiences anincrease in its net-of-tax rates
that is half as large as thatexperienced by the high-income taxpayers, so
° Feldstein and Feenberg (1996) note a decrease in top reportedincomes from 1992 to 1993
and interpret this finding as evidence oflarge behavioral elasticities. As compensationof
executives continued to soar throughoutthe late 1990s, negative long-run elasticityesti-
mates would be obtained by repeatingGoolsbee's (2000a) analysis and comparing incomes
in 1992 to those of the late 1990s.124Saez
that z log(1TM)= 0.5log(1tH). Then the estimatedelasticity ê will
be twice the true elasticitye of the high-income group, a dramatic upward
bias in the estimate. This simple butrealistic example shows that it isnot
appropriate to rely on comparisons of theresponsiveness of the reported
incomes of the middle- and upper-incomegroups when there is a strong sus-
picion that the behavioral elasticities for thetwo groups are quite different.
Fourth, the increases in top incomesfollowing the 1980s tax changes
might have been due partly to incomeshifting rather than the creation of
new income. As I show below, the critical distinction forpolicy and welfare
analysis is whether the increase in reportedincomes comes at the expense
of untaxed activities (for example, leisure,fringe benefits, and perquisites)
or taxed activities (for example, profits in thecorporate sector, future capi-
tal gains, and deferred compensationsuch as pensions). Slemrod (1996)
points out that part of thesurge in top incomes following TRA 1986was
due to a dramatic increase in S-corporationincome, suggesting thatmany
businessowners switched the legal form of theircorporations from Sub-
chapter C (which faces thecorporate income tax on profits) toward
Subchapter S (which does not face thecorporate tax and whose profits are
taxed directly at the individual level) becausethe top individual income tax
rate became lower than the corporate incometax rate by 1988.12 Carroll and
Joulfaian (1997) explore this issue inmore detail using a panel of corpora-
tions from 1985 to 1990, and they confirmSlemrod's (1996) earlier findings.
Gordon and Slemrod (2000) performa systematic study of income shifting
by analyzing simultaneously tax changesand reported incomes at thecor-
porate and personal level. In thispaper, I analyze in detail the composition
of reported individual incomes tocast light on the source of the changes in
reported incomes following tax reforms.
The early studies by Lindsey (1987) andFeenberg and Poterba (1993)
used the large and stratified armualcross-sectional public-use tax return
data to document the evolution oftop reported incomes. Following
Feldstein's (1995) influential analysis of theTRA 1986, several studies
have used panel data to estimateelasticities. The main justification for
12A C-corporation faces the corporate taxon its profits. Profits are then taxed again at the
individual level if they are paid outas dividends. If profits are retained in the corporation,
they may generate capital gains thatare taxed at the individual level, but in general would
be taxed more favorably than dividends, whenthey are realized. Profits from S-corporations
(or partnerships and sole proprietorships)are taxed directly and solely at the individual
level. Distributions from S-corporationsto individual owners generate no additionaltax. Thus, an S-corporation is fiscally more advantageousthan a C-corporation the lower the
individual tax rate, the higher the corporate taxrate, and the higher the capital gains tax rate.
See Scholes and Wolfson (1992, Chapter 4) forextensive details and examples. A business
can switch to and from the C and S status, but an S-corporationcannot have more than a limited number of stockholders (75 currently),issue more than one class of stock,or be a subsidiary of other corporations.Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates,1960-2000125
using panel data instead ofrepeated cross-sections was that theymight
alleviate the issue of non-tax-relatedchanges in income inequality
because the same individuals arefollowed before and after the reform. It
is plausible to think, however,that an increase in income inequalitymight
be due mostly to high-incomeindividuals experiencing larger gainsthan
do lower-income individuals; inwhich case, a panel analysis does not
solve the issue. Furthermore, a tax cutmight induce middle-income peo-
ple to try harder to becomerich, and this behavioral responsewill be
missed by a Feldstein-type panel dataanalysis.
The use of panel data has twoadditional important drawbacks. First,
the publicly available panel of tax returnsis not stratified and hence does
not allow nearly as precise astudy of the evolution of top incomes asdoes
the large, stratifiedcross-sections.13 Second, comparing groupsranked
according to pre-reform incomes generates a meanreversion problem: if
there is mobility in incomes from yearto year, then it can causehigh-
income taxpayers in one year to appearin low-income brackets in the
next, aside from any truebehavioral response.'4 Eliminating thismobility
bias requires control of pre-reformincome in the estimation, butthis
approach will weaken and possiblydestroy identification because the size
of net-of-tax-rates changes isclosely correlated with income.'5
Many authors, including Lindsey(1987) himself, have argued that com-
paring income groups usingrepeated cross-sections is a valid strategy
only if taxpayers stay in the same groupsfrom year to year. Following a
tax rate cut such as ERTA1981 or TRA 1986, however, onewould like to
know how the distribution ofreported income has changed relative to a
scenario where the tax changedoes not take place. Whetherthere is
mobility in incomes from year to yearis independent of this question as
long as the income distribution isstationary (without the tax change).In
contrast, mobility in incomes isprecisely what complicates the paneldata
analysis. Panel data have keyadvantages, however, for studying some
questions more subtle than theoverall response of reported incomes.For
example, if one wants to study how atax change affects income mobility
13Auten and Carroll (1999) have used alarger panel available only at the U.S. Treasury to
compare years 1985 and 1989.It is difficult, however, to create longerpanels to analyze
longer-term time series because of attritionissues.
14This would generate a downward bias inthe elasticity estimates in the case of a tax rate
decrease, such as TRA 1986, and anupward bias in the case of a tax rate increase,such as
OBRA 1993.
15This point is discussed in Gruber and Saez(2002), who overcome this problem by using
many years instead of just twoin the analysis. The implicit assumptionthey make, however,
is that mobility remains stable from yearto year.126Saez
(i.e., do more middle-incometaxpayers become successful entrepreneurs
following a tax rate cut?), panel datais clearly necessary.
Measuring the tax-induced change inthe income distribution is exactly
what is needed to derive the taxrevenue consequences of the tax change.
Because we do not observe thecounterfactual income distribution when
no tax change takes place, we have to relyon income distributions from
previous years, and there isno systematic bias in the repeatedcross-
section analysis as long as the income distributionremains stationary,
without the tax change. The direct focuson the income distribution series
over time allows a much more concrete and simplegrasp of the evolution
of incomes for differentgroups than does panel analysis because it is
straightforward to divide the population intovarious percentiles for each
year and to analyze simultaneously the evolution of theincomes and the
marginal tax rates of thesegroups. By relating the changes in incomes to
the changes in net-of-tax rates,we can obtain elasticity estimates.
Finally, Slemrod (1998) and Slemrod andKopczuk (2002) make the
important point that the elasticity of reportedincomes with respect to tax
rates might not be a fixed parameter, and itdepends on the legal details
and the enforcement of the taxsystem. For example, if it is easy forcor-
porations to switch from Subchapter Cto Subchapter S to avoid taxes, the
individual tax base might be muchmore elastic than in a setting where
Subchapter S corporations do not exist.Kopczuk (2003) performsan
empirical analysis of this issue for the UnitedStates from 1979 to 1990 and
shows that taxable income elasticitiesare negatively related to the base of
incomes subject to taxes. This resultsuggests that introducing additional
deductions increases the responsivenessof taxable incomes. Goolsbee
(1999) studies the key tax changes in theUnited States since the 1920s and
finds enormous heterogeneity in theobserved responses from episodeto
episode, although he does not try to explainthe discrepancies. Thepres-
ent analysis of the period 1960-2000 also displayssignificant heterogene-
ity in responses over time.
2.2 Using Elasticities for Tax Policy
The empirical analysis that follows willshow that evidence of behavioral
responses to changes in marginal tax rates isconcentrated in the top of the
income distribution, with little evidenceof any response for the middle-
income and upper-middle-income class.16Therefore, it is useful to focus
16The low end of the income distribution is beyondthe scope of this paper becausemany low-income families and individuals donot ifie income tax returns. The large amount of
research on responses to welfare and income transferprograms targeted toward low-income
earners has displayed evidence, however, of significant laborsupply responses. See Meyer
and Rosenbauni (2001), for example, fora recent analysis.Reported Incomes and Marginal TaxRates, 1960-2000127
on the analysisof the effects of increasingthe marginal tax rate on the
upper end of theincome distribution.Therefore, let us assume that
incomes in the top bracket,above a given threshold 1,face a constant
marginal tax rate 'c.17 N is thenumber of taxpayers in the topbracket.
Assume that incomesreported in the top bracketdepend on the net-of-
tax rate 1 - 'c, and z(1 - 't) denotes the average incomereported by tax-
payers in the top incomebracket. As discussed above, incomeeffects in
the analysis are ignored,and thus the net-of-tax rate is theonly relevant
parameter. The elasticity(compensated or uncompensated becausethere
are no incomeeffects) of income in the topbracket with respect to the net-
of-tax rate is therefore defined as e=[(1 - 'r)/z}az/(l - 'c). Supposethat
the government increasesthe top income tax rate 'c by asmall amount d't
(with no change in the taxschedule for incomes below ll).This small tax
reform has two effects on tax revenue.First, there is a mechanical increase
in tax revenue because taxpayersface a higher tax rate on theirincomes
above ll. Hence, the totalmechanical effect is:
dM=N [z - ll] d'c
This mechanical effect is theprojected increase in tax revenue,without
any behavioral response.
Second, the increase in the tax ratetriggers a behavioral responsethat
reduces the average reported incomein the top bracket by dz=e z d'c/
(1 - 'r) on average, and henceit produces a loss in tax revenueequal to:
dB=N e z
Summing the mechanical andthe behavioral effect, I obtainthe total
change in tax revenue due tothe tax change:
dR=dM+dB=Ndr(z)[1etzz 1t
Let us use a to denote the ratioz/(z -). Note that aand that a=1
when ll=0, that is, when there is asingle flat tax rate applying toall
incomes. If the top tail ofthe distribution is Paretodistributed, then the
parameter a does not vary withand is exactly equal to the Pareto param-
eter.18 Because the tails of actual incomedistributions are closely approx-
imated by Pareto distributions,it turns out that thecoefficient a is
17In the case of the 2003 tax law, forexample, taxable incomes above=$311,950 are taxed
at the top marginal tax rate ofr =35 percent.
A Pareto distribution has a densityfunction of the formf(z)C/z'+ ,where C and a are
constant parameters; a is called thePareto parameter.128Saez
extremely stable for 2 above $200,000.Saez (2001) provides suchan empir-
ical analysis for 1992 and 1993 incomesusing tax return data. Theparam-
eter a measures the thinness of thetop tail of the income distribution: the
thicker the tail of the distribution,the larger z is relative to 2, and hence
the smaller is a. Feenberg andPoterba (1993) provide estimates ofthe
Pareto parameter a from 1951to 1990 for the distribution of adjustedgross
income (AGI) in the United Statesusing income tax returns. They show
that a has decreased from about2.5 in the early 1970s to around 1.5in the late l980s.19
We can rewrite the effect of the smallreform on tax revenue dR simplyas:
dR=dM[1_T.__ea] (1)
Equation (1) is of central importance.It shows that the fraction oftax rev- enue lost through behavioral responsesthesecond term in the square
bracket expressionisa simple function increasing in the taxrate 'r, the
elasticity e, and the Paretoparameter a. This expression is also equalto the
marginal deadweight burden created bythe increase in the tax rate. More
precisely, because of the envelope theorem,the behavioral responsecreates
no additional welfare loss because individualsare maximizing utility, and
thus the utility loss (in dollarterms) created by the tax increaseis exactly
equal to the mechanical effect dM.However, tax revenue collectedis only dR dM + dB, with dB< 0. Thus, dB represents indeed the extraamount
lost in utility over and above thetax revenue collected, dR. Themarginal
excess burden expressed in terms of extra taxescollected is simply:
dBear
dR - 1 - - e a
These formulas are valid forany tax rate 'r and income distribution,
even if individuals have heterogeneous utility functionsand behavioral
elasticities, as long as income effectsare assumed away.2° Thus, this for-
mula should be preferred to theHarberger triangle approximations,
which require small tax ratesto be valid. The parametersr and a are
straightforward to obtain; the elasticityparameter e is thus the central
nontrivial parameter necessaryto make use of equations (1) and (2). For
example, in 2000, for the top 1percent income cutoff (corresponding
Piketty arid Saez (2003) provide estimatesof thresholdsand average incomes z corre- sponding to various fractiles within the topdedile of the U.S. income distribution from1913 to 2000. This approach allows a straightforwardestimation of the parameter a forany year and income threshold.
20The elasticity e is the average (incomeweighted) of individual elasticities.
(2)Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates,1960-2000129
approximately to the top 39.6 percentfederal income tax bracket in that
year), Piketty and Saez (2003) estimatethat a=1.6. For an elasticity esti-
mate e=0.5, corresponding to themid- to upper range of the estimates
from the literature, thefraction of tax revenue lostthrough behavioral
responses (dB/dM),should the top tax rate be increasedslightly, would be
52.5 percent, more thanhalf of the mechanical projected increasein tax
revenue. In terms ofmarginal excess burden, increasing tax revenueby $1
requires the creation of autility loss of 1/(1 - .525)=$2.11 for taxpayers,
and hence a marginal excessburden of $1.11, or 111 percent ofthe extra $1
tax collected.
Following the supply-side debatesof the early 1980s, much attentionhas
been focused on the tax ratewhich maximizes tax revenue,the so-called
Laffer rate. The Laffer rate 'rmaximizes tax revenue; hence, thebracketed
expression in equation (1) isexactly zero when t='r. Rearranging the
equation, we obtain the followingsimple formula for the Laffer tax rate 'r
for the top bracket:
(3)
A top tax rate above theLaffer rate is an inefficient situationbecause
decreasing the tax rate would increaseboth government revenue and the
utility of high-incometaxpayers.21 At the Laffer rate, the excessburden
becomes infinite because raising moretax revenue becomesimpossible.
Using our previous examplewith e=0.5 and a=1.6, the Laffer rate
would be 55.6 percent, notmuch higher than the combinedmaximum
federal, state, Medicare, and sales taxrate. Note that when=0 and the
tax system has a single tax rate,the Laffer rate becomes the well-known
expression=1/(1 + e). Because a1, the flat rate maximizing tax rev-
enue is alwayslarger than the Laffer ratefor high incomes only.
Increasing the top tax ratecollects extra taxes only on the portionof
incomes above the bracketthreshold but produces a behavioral response
for high income taxpayers as large as anacross-the-board increase in mar-
ginal tax rates.
The analysis has assumed sofar that the reduction in incomesdue to
the tax rate increase has no othereffect on tax revenue. This assumption
21When the government has strongredistributive tastes and does not valuethe marginal
consumption of high-incomeindividuals relative to the average individual,the optimal
income tax rate for high-incomeindividuals is exactly equal to the Laffer rate inequation (3).
When the government generallyvalues the marginal consumption ofhigh-income individ-
uals at 0 <1, the optimal tax rate for thehigh-income individuals is such that thebrack-
eted expression in equation (1) isequal to g. See my earlier work (Saez,2001) for a more
detailed exposition following the classicaloptimal income tax theory of Mirrlees (1971).130Saez
is reasonable if the reduction in incomesis due to reduced labor supply
(and hence an increase in untaxedleisure time) or to a shift from cash
compensation toward untaxed fringe benefitsor perquisites (more gener-
ous health insurance, better offices,company cars, etc.). In many
instances, however, the reduction inreported incomes is due in part toa
shift away from individual incometoward other forms of taxable income
such as corporate income,or deferred compensation, that will be taxable
to the individual when paid out (seeSlemrod, 1998). For example,
Slemrod (1996) and Gordon and Slemrod(2000) show convincingly that
part of the surge in top incomes after the TaxReform Act of 1986 was due
to a shift of income from the corporatesector toward the individualsec-
tor. I will cover this topic in detail later.
Therefore, let us assume that the incomesthat disappear from the indi-
vidual income tax base following thetax rate increase cit are shiftedto
other bases taxed at rateton average. For example, if two-thirds of the
reduction in individual reported incomesis due to increased leisure and
one-third is due to a shift toward thecorporate sector,twould be one-
third of the corporate tax rate because leisureis untaxed. In that case, it is
straightforward to show that equation (1)becomes:
dR=dM[1- ea] (4)
The same envelope theorem logicapplies for welfare analysis, and the
marginal deadweight burden formula isalso modified accordingly by
replacinge at bye a(t -t)in both the numerator and denominatorof
equation (2). The Laffer rate in equation (3)becomes:
1 +ta e
1+ae
If we assume again thata= 1.6 ande =.5, but that incomes disappear-
ing from the individual baseare taxed att= 20 percent on average, the
fraction of revenue lost due to behavioralresponses drops from 52.5 to 26
percent, and the marginal excess burden (expressedas a percentage of
extra taxes raised) decreases from 111to 35 percent if the initial top tax
rate is t = 39.6 percent. The Lafferrate increases from 55.6 to 64.5 percent.
This simple theoretical analysis showstherefore that, in addition to esti-
mating the elasticitye,it is critical to analyze thesource or destination of
changes in reported individual incomes.
2.3 Data and Methodology
I estimate the level and shares of totalincome accruing to variousupper-
income groups using the largecross-sectional individual tax return data
(5)Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates,1960-2000131
annually released by the InternalRevenue Service (IRS) since1960.22 The
data are a stratified sampleof tax returns oversampled forhigh-income
taxpayers, which allows anextremely precise analysis of topreported
incomes. The top incomeshares are estimated based onthe Piketty and
Saez (2003) analysis.23 Theunit of analysis is the tax unitdefined as a mar-
ried couple living together (withdependents) or a single adult (with
dependents), as in the current taxlaw. It is important to notethat top
income shares series measured atthe tax unit level, as I do here,might be
different from series estimated atthe individual level. Asdisplayed in
Table 1, since 1960, the averagenumber of individuals per tax unithas
decreased from 2.6 to 2.1 because ofthe decrease in the averagenumber
of dependent children per taxunit as well as the decrease inthe fraction
of married tax units. Thoselong-term demographic changesimply that
real average income growth per taxunit will be substantiallysmaller than
real income growth per capita.These demographic changes canalso affect
top income sharesif the reduction in tax unit size is notuniform across
income groups. However, thetax return data show that thereduction in
tax unit size has beenabout the same for high-income taxpayers asit has
for the U.S. population as awhole. From 1960 to 2000, thenumber of indi-
viduals per tax unit in the topdecile has declined from 3.6 to 2.9,which is
the same 20 percent decline asin the general population(from 2.6 to 2.1).
From 1960 to 2000, the fractionof married tax units has declinedfrom
about 60 to 50 percent for thetotal population (due to the increased num-
ber of single parents andunmarried couples) but only from 90 to85 per-
cent for the top decile tax units.An increase in single tax unitswith lower
incomes contributes toincreasing top income shares.Similarly, an
increase in the correlationof earnings between spouses (due,for example,
to the increased laborforce participation of marriedwomen) would also
increase top income sharesestimated at the tax unit level. Thoseslow
moving demographic changes aresmall, however, relative to thedramatic
trends I document and canexplain at best only a small fractionof the
changes in the top most incomeshares.
Each upper-income group isdefined relative to the total numberof
potential tax units in the entireU.S. population, estimated frompopula-
tion and family censusdata as the sum of married men,divorced and
widowed men and women, andsingle adults never married (age 20and
There is no micro data for years 1961,1963, and 1965.
The main (and very minor) difference isthat government transfers such as socialsecurity
benefits and unemployment compensationhave been excluded from the incomedefinition
in this paper to obtain better consistencyin the income definition over the years.The esti-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































above).24 The income definition Iuse is consistent over time and includes
all income items except realized capitalgains reported on tax returns and
before all deductions suchas adjustments to gross income, exemptions,
and itemized and standard deductions.25 Iexclude government transfers
such as social security (SS) benefits andunemployment insurance (UI)
benefits. Thus, my incomemeasure is defined as adjusted gross income
(AGI) less realized capital gains includedin ACT, less taxable SS and UI
benefits, plus all the adjustments togross income. Hence, my measure of
income is a broader measure than taxable income,on which many previ-
ous studies have focused.
If deductions to income, suchas charitable giving, mortgage interest
payments, etc., are also responsive to taxation, taxableincome might be
more responsive to tax rates than my broader incomemeasure. Because
the nature of deductions allowed has changedsubstantially over the
period 1960-2000, however, it is impossibleto construct a consistent tax-
able income definition over the full period. Asa result, refer to previous
studies analyzing specifically thecomponents of taxable income that I
exclude from the analysis.
As in Piketty and Saez (2003), I considervarious groups within the top
decile of the income distribution. Toget a more concrete sense of those
upper-income groups, Table 2 displays the thresholds,the average income
level in each group, and the number oftax units in each group, all for
2000. The median income as wellas the average income for the bottom 90
percent of tax units, are quite low, around $25,000.Those numbers are
smaller than those reported by the CensusBureau based on the Current
Population Survey (CPS) for tworeasons. First, my income definition
does not include any government transfers.Second, CPS income is
reported at the household level, which isa larger unit than the tax unit I
consider.26
The groups in the top decile below thetop 1 percent (the top 10-5 per-
cent denotes the bottom half of the top decile,and the top 5-1 percent
denotes the next four percentiles) haveaverage incomes of $100,000 and
$160,000, respectively, which corresponds to thepopular view of the middle-
income and upper-middle-income class (perhapssurprisingly given how
24From 1960 to 2000, between 90 and 95 percent ofpotential tax units actually filed an
income tax return because many nontaxable families fileto get tax refunds.
25Realized capital gains are excluded because they forma volatile component of income
and face in general a different tax treatment than do otherforms of income. Much of the lit-
erature focuses on the response of capital gains realizationsto tax changes. See Auerbach
(1988) for a survey.
26For example, a cohabiting couple or two roommates forma single household but are two separate taxpayers.TABLE 2
Thresholds and average incomes in top income groupsin 2000
Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates,1960-2000135
Notes: Computations are based on income tax returnstatistics.
Income is defined as annual gross incomereported on tax returns excluding capital gains and all gov-
ernment transfers (such as social security,unemployment benefits, welfare payments, etc.) andbefore
individual income taxes and employees' payroll taxes.Amounts are expressed in 2000 dollars.
Column (2) reports the income thresholdscorresponding to each of the percentiles in column (1).For
example, an annual income of at least $87,334 isrequired to belong to the top 10 percent tax units, etc.
far up the income distribution those groupsare). In 2000, an annual fam-
ily income of at least $280,000 isrequired to be part of the top 1 percent.
Hence, the top 1 percentcorresponds perhaps to the popular viewof the
high-income tax payers. About 140,000 taxunits (or slightly more than 0.1
percent of all tax units) reportincomes larger than $1 million(the high-
income taxpayers). Finally, the top.01 percent, the smallest top groupI
consider, is formed by the top 13,400 taxunits, who reported, on average,
$13 million of annual income in2000. These are the super-high-income
American families.
I estimate shares of income bydividing the income amounts accruing
to each group by reportedincome, and I have assumed thatnonfiling
units earn 20 percent of the averageincome.27 I then estimate the compo-
sition of income for each groupand consider seven components: salaries
and wages (including exercised stockoptions, bonuses, and private pen-
sions), S-corporation income, soleproprietorship (Schedule C income)
and farm income, partnership income,dividends, interest income, and
other income (including smaller itemssuch as rents, royalties, and other
miscellaneous items).
Marginal tax rates are estimated usingthe TAXSIM tax calculator. For
each individual record, I compute aweighted marginal tax rate based on
wage income and otherincome because various provisionsin the tax code
Because only between 5 and 10 percentof tax units do not file returns, my results arenot
















































generate differences in the tax treatment ofwage income and other forms
of income. For each incomegroup, I then estimate an average marginal
tax rate weighted by income.28 Note thatmy marginal tax rate computa-
tions ignore state income taxes because thedata does not provide state
information for high-incomeearners. My tax measure also ignores other
taxes such as social security and Medicaretaxes, corporate taxes, and non-
income taxes such as sales and excisetaxes.
I use the same methodology tocompute top wage shares usingwages
and salaries reported on tax returns. Wagesand salaries include exercised
stock options and bonuses. In thiscase, groups are defined relative to the
total number of tax units, with positivewage income estimated as the
number of part-time and full-time workers fromthe National Income and
Product Accounts less the number ofmarried women who are employees.
The sum of total wages in theeconomy used to compute shares is
obtained from the National Income and ProductAccounts (total compen-
sation of employees). The marginaltax rates for upper-wage-income
groups are, of course, those relevant forwages and salaries and are also
weighted by wage income (see Table 1).
I propose a simple time-series regressionmethodology to obtain vari-
ous elasticity estimates, and illustrate some of the identificationdifficul-
ties. Because of potential heterogeneityin elasticities across income
groups, all regressions are run for a single incomegroup. The simplest
specification consists in regressing log realincomes on log net-of-tax rates
(and a constant) for a givengroup. Of course, as real incomes grow over
time, time trends can be added in theregression to control for exogenous
(i.e., non-tax-related) real incomegrowth. These estimates are unbiased
estimates of behavioral elasticities if, absentany tax change, real incomes
in that specific group do not change (firstspecification) or follow a regu-
lar time pattern (second specification).These assumptions may not be
met. Because many years of dataare included, these estimates capture
mostly the long-term behavioral elasticities.29As we will see, the pattern
of average incomes for the full populationdoes not appear to be related
to the evolution of average marginaltax rates. Therefore, to control for
average income growth, most of the regressionsare run in terms of log
income shares instead of logaverage incomes.30 These regressions control
28As we saw above, for tax policy analysis, it isnecessary to weight marginal tax rates by income.
29J leave for future research the regression analysis of thedynamics of tax responses. Such
a formal analysis has been attempted in the case of capital gains realizations.See, for exam- ple, Auerbach (1988).
30Slemrod (1996) adopted the same approach, althoughhe controlled for nontax factors
explicitly rather than using general time trends controls,as I do here.Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates,1960-2000137
automatically for overall income growth.Adding time trends in that case
amounts to assuming that incomesfor the particular group considered
may diverge fromthe average income in the economy. Becausetime-
series regressions are run and the errorterms appear to be correlated over
time (according to the standardDurbin-Watson test), Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) standard errors are notcorrect. Therefore, the Newey-West
standard errors are computed, assumingthat the error terms can be cor-
related up to an eight-year lag.31
Because of the progressive structureof the income tax, increases in
incomes lead to higher marginal tax rates, orbracket creep. As a result, an
increase in top income shares (fornon-tax-related reasons) might also induce
a mechanical increase inthe marginal tax rate faced by thosehigh-income
taxpayers, hence potentiallybiasing downward the elasticity estimates.
A simple way to investigate the extentof the problem is to use the statutory
top marginal income tax rate(or more precisely, the log of 1 minus the top
rate) as an instrument for the effectivelog net-of-tax-rate variable. The
results show that the OLS andInstrumental Variables (IV) estimates are
extremely close, suggesting that progressive structureof the income tax sys-
tem and bracket creep do not create asignificant estimation problem.
3. INCOME SHARES ANDMARGINAL TAX
RATES
3.1 Trends in Average Incomes
Figure 1 shows the averagefederal marginal individual income tax rate
(weighted by income) and the average income(per tax unit) reported in
real terms for the full populationfrom 1960 to 2000. Incomes are
expressed in 2000 dollars using thestandard Consumer Price IndexAll
Urban Consumers (CPI-U) deflator(see Table 1). Figure 1 also shows that
real incomes increased quickly from1960 to 1973 and then increased
hardly at all until the early 1990s. From1993 to 2000, real incomes have
increased quickly but are only 13 percenthigher than in 1973. Real growth
depends critically on the ConsumerPrice Index (CPI) deflator.
Improvements in the CPI estimationhave been made over the years, and
some of them havebeen incorporated retrospectively inthe so-called
Consumer Price Index Research Seriesusing current methods (CPI-U-RS)
deflator (see Stewart and Reed, 1999).Using the CPI-U-RS instead of the
CPI-U would display about 29 percentreal income growth instead of 13
percent from 1973 to 2000 (see Table1).
3'An eight-year lag is close to maximizingthe size of the standard errors and thus should



























FIGURE 1. Average Real Income, Marginal andAverage Tax Rate, All
Tax Units, 1960-2000
Note: Based on Table 1.
Average marginal tax rates display significantmovements, with a
steady increase from 21-22 to 30 percent from themid-1960s to the early
1980s (with a temporary surge during the VietnamWar surtaxes from
1968 to 1970). Tn the 1980s, theaverage marginal tax rate decreased to
23 percent, and it increased slightly to 26percent during the 1990s. Figure
1 displays no clear relationship between the level ofreal incomes and the
level of marginal tax rates. As displayed in panelA of Table 3, a simple
OLS regression of log average incomeson the log of the net-of-tax rate,
always displays insignificant elasticity coefficients.Therefore, the aggre-
gate data display no evidence of significant behavioralresponses of
reported incomes relative to changes in theaverage marginal tax rate.
Figure 2 shows a striking contrast between the bottom99 percent tax
units (panel A) and the top 1 percent (panel B). Theaverage real income
of the bottom 99 percent increased steadily from1960 to 1973 and then
stagnated; real incomes in 2000are hardly higher than in 1973.32 The
decline in marginal tax rates faced by the bottom99 percent, from almost
32Jf one uses the CPI-U-RS deflator, the bottom 99percent of real incomes would have
grown by about 13 percent. In any case, it is clear that real growth of incomes hasbeen slow
in the last quarter of the twentieth century relativeto the 1950-1973 period. It is also impor-
tant to note that this slow growth is not due to a decrease in thenumber of adults per tax
units (see Table 1).
-*-Marginal tax rate
income 0--Average
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TABLE 3
Elasticities of income with respectto net-of-tax rates inthe aggregate,
bottom 99%, and top 1%
Regression Regression
Regression in levels + in levels +
in levels time controltime controls
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: all tax units






Panel B: bottom 99% tax units






Panel C: top 1% tax units






Notes: Estimates obtained by time-seriesregression of log(average real income) (usingCPI-U deflator) on
a constant, log(1 - averagemarginal tax rate) from 1960 to 2000 (38observationS). In column 1, simple
OLS regression is run, standard errorsfrom Newey-West with 8 lags. In column2, a time trend is added.
In column 3, time "2 trend is added.
30 percent in 1981 toaround 23 percent in 2000, does not seemto have
noticeably improved the growthof real incomes. Indeed, asshown in
panel B of Table 3, regressingthe log average incomes onthe log net-of-
tax rate for the bottom99 percent displays negative(although insignifi-
cant) coefficients whether or not atime trend is included.
In stark contrast, the averagereal income of the top 1 percenthas
increased by 160 percent since theearly 1970s (or by 200 percentif one
uses the CPI-U-RS),and the average marginal tax ratehas also declined
substantially, from around 50 percentbefore 1981 to less than 30 percent
by 1988. It is striking to notethat the top 1 percent incomesstart increas-
ing precisely in 1981,when marginal tax rates start goingdown. The jump
in top incomes from 1986 to1988 corresponds exactly tothe sharp drop in
marginal tax rates, from 45 to 29percent, after the Tax ReformAct of 1986.
These points, first notedby Feenberg and Poterba(1993), suggest that
high-income taxpayers areindeed quite responsive to taxation.The other
striking feature of the figureis the extraordinary increasein top incomes140Saez
A. Bottom 99% tax units
Year





-h- Marginal tax rate-.-- Income share
FIGURE 2. Marginal Tax Ratesand Average Real Incomes for the
Bottom 99% and the Top 1%
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0%Reported Incomes and Marginal TaxRates, 1960-2000141
from 1994-2000, in spiteof the increase in tax rates, fromabout 32 percent
to almost 40 percent in1993. Thus, although themarginal tax rates faced
by high-income taxpayersin 2000 are hardly lower thanin the mid-1980s
(39 percent instead of 4445 percent), top incomes are morethan twice as
large.
Figure 2 illustrates clearlythe difficulty of obtainingconvincing esti-
mates of the elasticityof reported income with respect tothe net-of-tax
rate. It seems obviousthat the sharp, andunprecedented1 increase in
incomes from 1986 to 1988is related to the large decreasein marginal tax
rates that happenedexactly during those years. Thecentral issue, how-
ever, is whetherthis short-term response persists overtime. In particular,
how should we interpret thecontinuing rise in top incomes since1994? If
one thinks thatthis surge is evidence of divergingtrends between high-
income taxpayers and the restof the population independentof tax pol-
icy, which started in the 1970s,then it is tempting to considerthe response
to TRA 1986 as apurely short-term spike followedby lower growth from
1988 to 1993, before gettingback to the normal upward trendby 1994. On
the other hand, one could arguethat the surge in top incomessince the
rnid-1990s might have been thelong-term consequence of thedecrease
in tax rates in the 1980sand that such a surge would nothave occurred
had tax rates for high-incometaxpayers remained ashigh as they did in
the 1960s and 1970s. I will return tothis point later.
These issues are illustratedformally in the regression results inpanel C
of Table 3. When no timetrend is included in the regressionof log income
on log net-of-tax rate,all the growth in top incomesis attributed to the
decline in top rates, and theelasticity obtained is extremelylarge 1.83
(.37). In contrast, including atime trend produces amuch smaller,
although still sizable, elasticityof .71 (.22) because part of therise in top
incomes is attributed to asecular rise. Adding an additionaltime square
control further reduces theelasticity to 0.5 (0.18).
This analysis also shows thatcomparing two single years bytaking the
ratio of the difference inlog incomes to the differencein log net-of tax
rates, as is done in moststudies, can produce a wide rangeof elasticity
estimates. Comparing 1981 to1984, as in Lindsey (1987),produces an elas-
ticity of Comparing 1985 and 1988, as inFeldstein (1995) and Auten
and Carroll (1999), produces anextremely large 1.7 elasticity.34 Incontrast,
Lindsey (1987) obtains larger estimatesbecause he compares the upper-income tothe
middle-income groups, creating anupward bias if, as is apparent in the data,elasticities are
increasing with income (see discussion insection 2.1).
Auten and Carroll (1999) obtain amuch smaller 0.6 elasticity because they compare1985
to 1989 (instead of 1988, asdid Feldstein [19951) and because of the meanreversion issue dis-
cussed in Section 2.1, which isdifficult to correct with only two years ofdata.142Saez
comparing 1991 to 1994 (as in Goolsbee,2000b) produces a zero elasticity
because top incomes are aboutconstant, while tax rates increase by almost
10 percentage points.35 The elasticitywould even become negative ifone
compares 1991 to the late l990s because both top incomesand the tax rate
have increased.36 The large micro datasets can be used to obtain these
simple elasticity estimates directlyfrom regressions at the individual
level, as is done in many studies,with small standarderrors. The regres-
sion counterpart would be to poolthe samples of top 1 percentearners for the pre- and postreformyears and run a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
regression of log incomeson the log net-of-tax rate using as an instrument
a postyear dummy.37 To cast additional lighton these issues and try to
separate tax effects from other effects, Iturn to a closer analysis of various
upper-income groups, with particular emphasison the change in the com-
position of reported incomes.
3.2 Trends in Top Income Shares andMarginal Tax Rates
Average real incomes do notseem to respond to average marginal tax
rates in the aggregate, andresponses seem to be concentrated in theupper
1 percent of the income distribution.From now on, therefore, top incomes
are normalized by considering the shares of totalincome accruing to var-
ious upper-income groups (as in Feenbergand Poterba, 1993, 2000, and
Piketty and Saez, 2003). Thisapproach has two advantages. First,the
income share measures are independentof the CPI deflator used. Second,
the top shares are normalizedautomatically for overall real and nominal
growth in incomes. All the top incomeshare series and corresponding
average marginal tax rates (income weighted)are reported in Tables 4
and 5, respectively.
Table 6 displays several regressionsof the (log) top 1 percent income
share on the log net-of-tax rate,varying the number of time trendcontrols
and instrumenting or not thetax variable with the log net-of-taxtop rate. As discussed above, introducingtime trends reduces substantially
the elasticity, from 1.6 (withno controls) to about 0.6-0.7 (withmany
controls). After adding linear andsquare controls in time, the adjusted
In confrast, comparing 1992 to 1993 wouldproduce a significant short-term elasticity of
0.63, as in Feldstein and Feenberg (1996).
36Carroll (1998) and Sammarth-io and Wiener (1997)analyze panel tax return data. They also show that short-term responses aroundOBRA 1992 are much larger than longer-term responses.
z' It is doubtful, however,that these small standard errors would beaccurate because ran- dom year effects are most likely to bepresent in the data, making 2SLS standarderrors far too low and hence worthless (in addition tocreating the identification problems discussed

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































R-square reaches 98 percent, and the elasticitycoefficient is not sensitive
to adding additional controls. The IV estimatesare close in magnitude to
the OLS estimates and havea strong first stage [except in the case of col-
umn (4) where the first stage is weak]. This finding suggests thatthe issue
of reverse causality because of the progressivenature of the tax schedule
is not an important issue. Figure 3 illustrates theseissues by plotting,
along with the top 1 percent income shareseries, the fitted values from the
regressions with no time controls (line with triangles)and with two time
controls (solid line). The line with triangles shows thatthe pure tax effects
explain quite poorly the evolution of the top 1percent income share. In con-
trast, the solid line with two time trends captures extremelywell the pattern
of the top 1 percent income share (the adjustedR-square of the regression
is 98 percent). The line with squares in Figure 3 displaysthe counterfac-
tual pattern, assuming that the marginal taxrate for the top 1 percent had
remained constant since 1960. Thiscurve shows that most of the growth
in the top 1 percent income share is due to the timetrends and that only
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FIGURE 3. The Top 1% Income Share and FittedValues from Elasticity
Regressions
Source: Series based on regression analysis presented in Table 6, columns(1) and (5).
Notes: The diamond line is the top 1 percent income share. The linewith triangles is the fitted regression
curve, including only the net-of-tax rate. The solid line is the fitted regressioncurve, including time controls.
The line with squares is the same fitted regression curve but themarginal tax rate is frozen at the 1960 value.Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates,1960-2000149
share from the 1960s to 2000 isdue to the decline in marginal tax rates.
Therefore, in summary, attributing all theincrease in the top income
shares to the tax developments generateslarge elasticities but fits the data
poorly. Controlling for time trends fits thedata much better and reduces
substantially the elasticity as well as thefraction of the increase in top
incomes that can be attributed to taxchanges.
Figure 4 displays the share of incomeaccruing to the bottom half of the
top decile (panel A) and tothe bottom half of the top percentile(panel B),
along with the average marginal tax ratefaced by these two groups. The
figure shows that the top 10-5 percentincome group has experienced
moderate gains since 1960, and the patternof the gains does not appear to
be correlated with the pattern of themarginal tax rates that the group
faces (rising up to 1981, then decliningin the 1980s, then stable in the
1990s). Panels A and B in Table 7 showthat regressing the log of the top
income shares of the top 10-5 percentand top 5i percent on their log net-
of-tax rates, with or without timetrend controls, produces elasticities
close to zero. Therefore, upper-middle-incomefamilies and individuals
(up to the top 1 percent threshold,around $280,000 per year in 2000) do
not appear to be sensitive totaxation.38 It is striking, in particular, that
these upper-middle-income taxpayershares increase little during the
1980s; although they experience quitesizable marginal tax rate cuts
(about 9 percentage points for the top10-5 percent, and over 13 pointsfor
the top 5-1 percent).39 Note again thatIV estimates are also almost iden-
tical to OLS estimates.
Panel B of Figure 4 shows that the top1.5 percent share does not
decrease during the 1970s, when themarginal tax rate increases from 40
to 50 percent, and does not increaseduring ERTA 1981, when the marginal
tax rate decreases back to 40percent. In contrast, TRA 1986,which
decreases the rate to around 32 percent(thus a smaller percentage change
in the net-of-tax rate relative tothe 1970s or ERTA 1981), does produce a
sizable increase in the income share,producing a noticeable break in the
series. The increase in tax rates, toabout 38 percent following OBRA 1992,
does not seem to have affected theupward trend following TRA 1986.
Thus, although marginal tax rates in thelate 1990s are about the same as
38 In principle, the secondary earner labor supply responsesshould be captured by those
elasticities. Thus, my results can be consistentwith the large married female labor supply
responses obtained by Eissa (1995)only if secondary earners' income is a small fractionof
total reported family incomes.
A similar regression analysis for other income groupsbelow the top dedile generates
small or even negative and alwaysinsignificant elasticities. The estimates are not precisely
estimated, however, because changes in net-of-tax rates aremuch smaller below the top
dedile.A. Top 10-5% tax units
Year




--- Marginal tax rate-.- Income share
FIGURE 4. Tax Rates and Income Shares for theMedium-High Income
Groups


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates,1960-2000153
in the 1960s, the incomeshare is 30 percent larger.4° Theregressions for the
top 1.5 percent and top.5.1 percent groups in Table 7(panels C and D)
display significant elasticities,but the size of the elasticity ismuch smaller
when income controls areincluded.
Figure 5 displays the shareof income and marginal tax ratesfor the
very top groups:the top .1.01 percent (panelA), and the top .01 per-
cent (panel B). The responsesto ERTA 1981 and TRA1986 and the short-
term response to OBRA1993, followed by a surgein income shares
since 1995, are even morepronounced than for the groups the top0.1
percent below. However, theKennedy tax cuts of the early1960s pro-
vide striking new evidence.For the topmost .01 percent,the progres-
sive tax structure of theearly 1960s generated extremelyhigh marginal
tax rates (around 80percent), which were reducedsignificantly by the
Kennedy tax cuts in 1964-1965 (toabout 65 percent).41 This implies a
75 percent increase in thenet-of-tax rate, a much larger increasethan
the ERTA 1981 and TRA 1986tax rate reductions. In spiteof this enor-
mous marginal tax ratecut, the topmost incomeshare remains flat in
the 1960s and well into the1970s, which suggests a completeabsence of
behavioral response in both theshort- and the long-run.42Note that,
although the top nominalmarginal tax rate was 91 percent,the average
marginal tax rate of the top .01 percentis only slightly above 80 percent.
This is due to various otherprovisions of the tax code, such asthe max-
imum average tax of87 percent on income andcharitable gifts by the
wealthy.43 Panels E and F of Table7 show that the regressionsfor the
top .1.01 percent andthe top .01 percent displaysignificant elasticities
in all specifications,although pure tax factors canexplain only a frac-
tion of the total increase inthe top most shares once exogenoustime
trends are included.
These considerations show again thatelasticity estimates would be extremelysensitive to
the time period considered. The ERTA1981 and OBRA 1993 episodess wouldproduce 0 elas-
ticity estimates, and TRA 1986would produce a sizable 0.93 estimate(comparing 1986 and
1988). Comparing 2000 to 1984 andattributing all the large increase in the share tothe mod-
est decrease in the marginal tax ratewould produce an enormous elasticityestimate of 4.94.
n These tax cuts were proposed by President Kennedyin the early 1960s but were actually
implemented by the Johnson administrationafter Kennedy's death in 1963.
42Lindsey (1990) claimed that the Kennedytax cuts generated a surge in topincomes, but
this erroneous result is due to hiscasual examination of the tabulationspublished by the IRS.
Goolsbee (1999) makes a more careful useof the same published data (although hedoes not
exclude realized capital gains and does not measuremarginal tax rates accurately) and finds
no response, as I do here.
Considering smaller groups at the very top,such as the top .001 percent, never generates





























A. Top 0.10-0.01% tax units
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FIGURE 5. Tax Rates and IncomeShares for the Top Groups
















3.0%Reported Incomes and Marginal TaxRates, 1960-2000155
3.3 Composition
In the previous subsection, we sawthat the income groups withinthe top
decile display very heterogeneous responses.Groups below the top 1 per-
cent never display evidenceof tax responsiveness. Top groupsdisplayed
a sharp response tothe 1980s tax cuts, especiallyTRA 1986, but only a
short-term response to the taxincrease of 1993, and no responsefor the
earlier tax cuts in the 1960s. To cast morelight on these findings, I now
turn to an analysis ofthe composition of those incomes.The complete
composition series of top income groups arereported in Tables Dl and D2
of Saez (2004), a longer versionof my work.
Figure 6 displays the evolutionof the top decile income sharefrom 1960
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FIGURE 6. The Top 10% IncomeShare and Composition, 1960-2000
Source: Tables B1 and Table Dl in Saez(2004).
Notes: The figure displays the income shareof the top 10 percent tax units and shows howthe top 10 per-
cent incomes are divided into seven incomecomponents: wages and salaries (includingexercised stock
options), S-corporation profits, partnershipprofits, sole proprietorship profits, dividends,interest
income, and other income.
" Previous studies have focused mostly ontaxable income elasticities. Feenberg and
Poterba (1993, 2000) analyze the compositionof incomes for the top .5 percent from1951 to




described in section 2. Wage incomeforms the majority of the top 10per-
cent of incomes, and its share has increasedsmoothly from two-thirds to
about three-quarters since 1960. Thelarge l2-percentage-point gainin the
top 10 percent income share (from 32to 44 percent) is due almost entirely
to a smooth and secular increase in thewage component (from 22 points
to 33.5 points), with the size of the othercomponents remaining stable
overall (around 10 points, witha squeeze around 7 points in the late 1970s
and early 1980s).
As depicted in Figure 7, the top 1percent income share increases from
8.3 percent to almost 17percent from 1960 to 2000. The striking feature,
however, is that 7 out of the8.7-point increase in the top 1percent share is due to the wage-incomecomponent. As a result, althoughwages repre-
sented only 40 percent of total income forthe top 1 percent in the early
1960s, they now representover 60 percent of top 1 percent incomes. The
increase in the wage componentappears to have started in the early 1970s
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FIGURE 7. The Top 1% Income Shareand Composition, 1960-2000
Source: Tables Bi and Table Dl in Saez (2004).
Notes: The figure displays the income share of thetop 1 percent tax units and shows how the top 1per- cent incomes are divided into seven incomecomponents: wages and salaries (including exercised stock
options), S-corporation profits, partnership profits,sole proprietorship profits, dividends, interest income, and other income.Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates,1960-2000157
(especially the 1990s). There are twospikes in the wage component series,
one in 1988 (justafter TRA 1986) and another in1992 (just before the
OBRA 1993 tax increase). However,the short-term nature of those two
spikes suggests that they werethe consequence of the retimingof wage
income to take advantageof lower rates.45
Although the nonwage part staysstable as a whole, the components
display interesting patterns.The most striking feature is the emergenceof
S-corporation income afterTRA 1986. Before the 1980s,S-corporation
income was extremely small.Indeed, the standard C-corporationform
was more advantageousfor high-income individual ownersbecause the
top individual tax rate wasmuch higher than the corporate taxrate and
taxes on capital gains wererelatively low. S-corporation incomeincreases
sharply from 1986 to 1988and increases slowly afterward.The sharp
increase in S-corporation incomejust after TRA 1986 certainlyreflects in
large part a shift in the statusfrom C-corporation to S-corporation status
to take advantage ofthe lower individual rates.46 Incontrast, dividends
(paid out by C-corporationsand foreign corporations) and solepropri-
etorship income decreasedregularly over the period. Partnershipincome
is about the same in the 1960s asin the 1990s; partnership income was
very small duringthe 1980s due to a dramatic increasein partnership
losses.47 The dramatic increase ofpartnership losses from the mid- tolate
1970s up to 1986 (during recessionsand recoveries alike) is probablydue
first to the increase in inflation,which might have increased losses
because of the deductibilityof nominal interest payments.48Then taxpay-
ers and tax accountantsmight have realized that partnershipsoffered an
attractive possibility for avoidingtaxes. The repeal of theinvestment tax
credit and the passive losseslimitations with the TRA 1986, aswell as the
reduction in top tax rates, havedrastically reduced the value of those tax
shelters and probably explainsthe quick and sustained disappearanceof
most partnership losses justafter TRA 1986.Sole proprietorship income
also displays a similar pattern,with a sharp reduction from themid-1970s
n Goolsbee (2000b) showed that many executivesexercised their stock options in 1992 to
take advantage of the low rateof 31 percent in 1992 before the increase to39.6 percent in
1993. This rethning explains the largedifference between the short-term and long-termelas-
ticity estimates using the OBRA1993 reform.
46 See Slernrod (1996), Carroll and Joulfaian (1997),and Gordon and Slemrod (2000) for a
more precise analysis.
"Partnership profits have stayed about stable overthe full period.
48 Note that interest income (which is not net of interestpayment deductions) is also partic-
ularly high during that period.
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FIGURE 8. The Top 0.01% Income Shareand Composition, 1960-2000
Source: Tables Bi and Table Dl in Saez (2004).
Notes: The figure displays the income share of the top.01 percent tax units and shows how the top .01per- cent incomes are divided into seven income components:wages and salaries (including exercised stock options), S-corporation profits, partnership profits,sole proprietorship profits, dividends, interest income, and other income.
to the mid-1980s.5° Although thewage income component starts to
increase in the early 1970s, the combinedeffect of sharp reductions in
partnership and sole proprietorship incomesfrom the mid-1970s to1981
explains why the top 1 percent incomeshare stays almost flatup to1981.
Figure 8 displays the income share andcomposition of the top .01 per-
cent group. It shows a dramatic shift in thecomposition of the topmost
incomes away from dividends (whichrepresented more than60percent
of top incomes in the early1960s)toward wage income (whichrepresents about60percent of top incomes in 2000).51 In theearly1960s,the top .01
percent incomes were facing extremely highmarginal tax rates of about
°° Sole proprietorshipincome displays a secular trend downward from1960 to 2000 most likely because of the secular decline in farmingand other traditional small-business activi-
ties organized in the form of sole proprietorships.
°' This secular shift fromrentiers to the working rich at the top of the U.S.income distribu- tion is described in more detail in Piletty and Saez(2003).
0
(0(0(0(0(0 0)0)0)0)0)Reported Incomes and Marginal TaxRates, 1960-2000159
80 percent on average(while tax rates on long-termcapital gains were
around 25 percent). Thus,dividends were a disadvantageousform of
income for the rich, whichsuggests that these top-income earnershad lit-
tie control over the formof payment and thus mighthave been passive
investors. The Kennedy tax cutsdid not reduce the topindividual rate
enough (the top rate became 70percent) to make the S-corporationform
attractive relative to theC-corporation form, which explainsperhaps the
contrast in behavioral responsesbetween the Kennedy tax cutsand the
tax changes of the1980s. This situation shows, asargued by Slemrod and
Kopczuk (2002), that the elasticityof reported incomes is not aconstant
parameter but may beextremely sensitive to the legalstructure and the
complete tax environmentfor corporations and individualsThe share of
dividends falls regularly over theperiod, while the share of wageincome
starts to increase in 1971.By 1979, the wage componentovertakes the div-
idend component. Figure 8shows clearly that ERTA 1981produced a sud-
den burst of S-corporationincome (which wasnegligible up to 1981)
mostly likely because of ashift from C-corporations toS-corporations.52
Note that the increase inS-corporation income isconcentrated mostly in
the top .01 percent and does nothappen at all for groups belowthe top .1
percent. This situation isconsistent with the taxminimization explana-
tion: ERTA 1981 decreasedmarginal tax rates significantlyonly for groups
above the top .1 percent,for whom the Subchapter S statusstarted to
become attractive when the topindividual rate was reduced to 50 per-
cent.53 Figure 8 shows thatalmost all the increase in top incomesfrom
1981 to 1984, first documentedby Lindsey (1987), is also due tothe surge
in S-corporation income.The wage component increases aswell but with
no noticeablebreak in the upward trendaround ERTA 1981.The 5-
corporation component increasesagain sharply from 1986 to1988 and
then stays about stableafterward. The wage componentalso presents a
spike in 1988 and in 1993,but these spikes seem to beshort-term
responses in a generallyupward trending curve. The tax cutsof the 1960s,
although extremely large,did not generate any behavioral responseper-
haps because top individualrates remained substantiallyhigher than the
corporate and capital gains taxrate and thus did notinduce top-income
taxpayers to switch corporateincome toward individualincome.
52As discussed in section 2.1, thisphenomenon has been well documentedin the case of
TRA 1986.
From 1980 to 1986, the corporate taxrate was 42 percent.
Because of the maximum tax of 50percent on labor income enactedin 1971-1972, the
marginal tax rates for top wage incomesactually did not change much withERTA; see
section 3.4.160Saez
Therefore, to sum up, the dramaticincrease in top income shares is due
primarily to a secular increase in thewage income component starting in
the early 1970s, and the largetax changes of TRA 1986 and OBRA1993
seem to have generated only short-term spikesin the overall upward and
accelerating trend of thewage component.55 The tax cuts of the l980s have
generated a surge in business incometaxed at the individual level. ERTA
1981 created a surge in S-corporationincome for the topmostgroups of
the income distribution. With TRA1986, S-corporation income surgedfor all upper-incomegroups. Partnership income alsorose dramatically
immediately after TRA 1986 mostlybecause of the disappearance ofpart- nership losses. These businessincome components have remainedrela-
tively stable after TRA 1986, whichsuggests they were theconsequence of a one-time shift from the corporatesector and the one-time closing of the
partnership loss tax shelters. Thetop tax rate increase of 1993 to 39.6per- cent (with a corporate tax rate of35 percent) was not largeenough to
induce businessowners to switchback to the C-corporationstatus. As a
result, OBRA 1993 did not produceany long-term income shiftingaway
from the individual sector, andits only effect seems to have beena short-
term retiming of salary income. Thesurge in business income reportedon
individual returns in the 1980scannot be interpreted as a supply-sidesuc-
cess because most of these individual incomegains came either at the
expense of taxable corporate incomeor could have been obtained from
the closing of tax shelters afterthe imposition of stricter ruleson losses
from passive businesses.56 Therefore,the success or failure of thetax cuts at generath-ig additional economicactivity must be deferred toa more
precise analysis of the centralwage income component, to whichwe now turn.
3.4 Top Wage Incomes
We have seen that most of the increasein top income shares since the
l9?Os is actually due toa sharp increase in the wage incomecomponent.
The time pattern of marginaltax rates for wage income is not thesame as
the pattern for other forms of incomebecause of the introduction ofthe
maximum tax rate on earned incomein 1971, which reduced thetop rate
Top income shares are flat before 1981,masking the increase in the wagecomponent, because of a large decline in partnershipand sole proprietorship income, duein turn per- haps to high interest rates and the developmentof tax shelters in the 1970s. Partnership
income and, to a lesser extent, sole proprietorshipincome increased back to their early 1970s levels immediately after TRA 1986.
56It is doubtful that the decrease in taxrates, by reducing the incentives to avoidtaxes, was necessary to eliminate abusive partnership losses (asargued, for example, in Samwick, 1996)
because partnership losses were almostnonexistent before the late 1970s, a time whentax rates were extremely high.Reported Incomes and MarginalTax Rates,1960-2000161
for earned incomefrom 70 percent (the toprate on other income) to60
percent in 1971 andthen 50 percent startingin 1972.This provision
became irrelevant in1982, when the top tax ratefor any income source
was reducedfrom 70 percent to 50percent. Therefore,analyzing the
wage incomecomponent separately isof particular interest. Allthe top wage
income share seriesand corresponding averagemarginal tax rates for
wage income arereported in Tables 8 and 9,respectively.
As for average income,the evolution of averagereal wage income
series (for the fullpopulation) does not appearto be correlatedwith the
evolution of marginal taxrates. Figure 9 showsthe pattern of real incomes
and marginal tax ratesfor the bottom 99 percent wageearners (panel A)
and the top 1 percent wageearners (panel B).The bottom 99 percenthave
experienced no realgrowth in wage income since1972, and the pattern of
changes in real wagesdoes not seem to berelated to changes inmarginal
tax rates. In contrast,top 1 percent wageincome earnersexperienced
accelerating growth overthe 1960 to 2000 period,with almost a tripling
in real wage incomesince the early 1970s.Consistent with the patternof
the wage componentfor overall income, top wageincome earners ex-
perienced spikes justafter TRA 1986 and justbefore OBRA 1993, clear
evidence of short-term responses(or retiming) of labor incomecompen-
sation. However, thelong-run pattern seems tobe an extraordinaryand
accelerating growthindependent of the taxdevelopments because mar-
ginal tax rates on these wageincome earners wereabout the same, around
40 percent, in themid-1960s and inthe mostrecent years. Indeed, the sec-
ular growth in top wagesstarts in the early 1970s, atime when marginal
tax rates wereactually increasing (duemostly to the progressive natureof
the income tax structureand the resulting bracketcreep). To understand
better thisunprecedented increase in top wageincomes, it is useful to
consider smaller groupswithin the top 1 percent, asI did for overall
income.
Table 10 produces the sameregressions as Table 7but for wage incomes
instead of overallincome.58 The shares of thebottom groups of the top
dedile below the top 1percent (top 10-5 percentand top 5-1 percent) dis-
play low elasticities,while all groups withinthe top 1 percent displaysig-
nificant elasticities when notime trend is included.The elasticities
increase sharply from0.3 to 2.5 as we move upthe wage income distribution
As described in Slemrod(1994), the marginal income taxrate on labor income couldbe
higher than these limits inseveral cases because of theinteraction of this provision withthe
regular schedule.
I have omitted the IV estimatesin the case of wages becausethe first stage is not as strong
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FIGURE 9. Marginal Tax Rates andAverage Real Wage Incomes for the
Bottom 99% and the Top 1%
Source: Based on Series obtained from Tables 1, 8, and9.
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Reported Incomes and Marginal TaxRates, 1960-2000167
TABLE 10
Elasticities of wage income shareswith respect to net-of-tax
rates for various upper wageincome groups
Newey-West Newey-West Newey-WestNewey-West
OLS OLS OLS OLS
regression, regression, regression, regression,
no time with time no time with time
controls controls controls controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Top wage income groups B. Intermediate groups
Top 10% Top 10-5%
-0.10 0.10 -0.43 -0.05
(0.55) (0.07) (0.18) (0.02)
Top 5% Top 5-1%
0.41 0.17 -0.17 0.07
(0.56) (0.09) (0.37) (0.02)
Top 1% Top 1-.5%
1.97 0.39 0.31 0.15
(0.45) (0.12) (0.48) (0.05)
Top 0.5% Top 0.5-0.1%
2.33 0.51 1.50 0.38
(0.54) (0.13) (0.32) (0.08)
Top 0.1% Top 0.1-0.01%
2.44 0.82 2.16 0.72
(0.43) (0.17) (0.37) (0.11)
Top 0.01% Top 0.01%
2.48 0.96 2.48 0.96
(0.50) (0.42) (0.50) (0.42)
Notes: Estimates obtained by time-seriesregression of log (top wage income share) on aconstant, log
(1 - average marginal tax rate), timetrend, and square of time trend from 1960 to2000 (38 observations).
In columns 1 and 3, OLS regression is run, notime trends included. Newey-Weststandard errors with 8 lags
reported. In columns 2 and 4, OLS regressionis run with time and time A2 trendincluded. Newey-West
standard errors with 8 lags reported.
because all the increase inthe top wage income shares isattributed to the
secular decline in marginal taxrates since the 1960s.Including two time
trends reduces significantlythe estimated elasticities,which are below 0.4
except for the topmost groups.Even within the top 0.1 percentgroup,
where elasticities are sizable, taxchanges can explain only asmall fraction
of the dramatic surge in top wageincomes.
They key point to resolve iswhether we should attributethe long-term
increase in top wage sharesentirely to the long-term decreasein marginal
tax rates. Comparing1960 and 2000, that view seems tobe untenable for
groups below the top.1 percent because these groupsfaced comparable
marginal tax rates in 1960 and in2000. As a result, the sizableincrease in168Saez
the top 1.5 percent and top .5.1 percent wage income sharescannot be
due entirely to marginal taxrates.
The problem is more complicatedfor the topmostgroups (within the top .1 percent) because thesegroups experienced much larger gains but
also experienced a nontrivial declinein marginal tax rates. Undoubtedly,
a reason for the huge increase in topwage income shares (the top .01per-
cent share increased more than tenfold,from .21 percent in 1970to 2.45
percent in 2000) has been the developmentof stock options. Stock options
also create lumpiness inwage compensation because theyare exercised by executives onlyonce every few years. As a result, thetop .01 percent
might be extremely large inrecent years because, in any givenyear, top- most wage earners are executiveswho happen to exercise theirstock options in that particularyear. The stock-option phenomenon, however,
has clearly increased theaverage compensation of top executives because
the top 1 percent (which certainlyincludes almost all the top employees
receiving large option grants,even when they do not exercise stock
options) more than doubles from5.1 to 12.6 percent from 1970 to2000.
Thus, the extraordinary increasein top wage incomes,a phenomenon
certainly closely related to theexplosion in the compensation ofchief
executive officers (CEOs) and othertop executives and sports, movie,and
television stars, appears too largeto have been solely the directconse- quence of the tax reductions throughsupply-side effects. Furthermore,
the surge in top wages is notrelated closely enough to the timingof the
tax cuts to suggest a direct andsimple causal link. Particularlysurprising is the surge in topwages since 1994, in spite of the significanttax increase
in 1993, which makes the secularreduction in marginal tax rates facedby
top wage groups appear rather small.59
A more pertinent issue is whetherthis surge in topwages could have
occurred had the tax structureremained the same as in the early1960s, when the working rich hadto pay in taxes more than three-quartersof their compensation. It is plausibleto think that the drastic reductionin top marginal tax rates, which startedin the 1960s, opened the possibility
of the dramatic increase in topwages that started in the l970s and accel-
erated in the 1980s and 1990s. Ofcourse, it is impossible to providea con- vincing answer to that importantissue by looking only at individual
income tax statistics in the UnitedStates. A promising approachwould be
to analyze executive compensation data.Many have researched executive
Companies might have started grantingstock options more aggressively after TRA1986, however, because of the decrease in individualtax rates. These options can be exercised (and thus appear on individual incometax returns) only several years later. However,Hall and Murphy (2003) show that grants ofstock options, valued using the Black-Scholesformula, increased significantly after the tax increaseof 1993.Reported Incomes and MarginalTax Rates, 1960-2000169
compensation; see Murphy(1999) for a survey.Although many studies
explain the disparity ofCEO pay in cross-sectionaldata, no convincing
explanation for the time-seriesevidence seems to have beenprovided.60 If
the dramatic surge in topcompensation is not fullyexplained by a com-
parable surge in themarginal productivity of topexecutives, then this
lack is evidence of amarket failure, whichwould certainly change the
welfare and tax policyanalysis that I presented above.Perhaps top exec-
utive pay may nowbe aligned withmarginal product and was below
market value before. Note,however, that the surgein the top 1 percent
salaries since the early1970s has been accompaniedby dismal growth
for the bottom 99 percentsalary earners and thus doesnot seem to have
had a positive impact onthe vast majority ofworking families. An alter-
native way to make progressin our understanding isby looking at com-




No other country offerssuch a large body ofempirical analysis on behav-
ioral responses to individualincome taxation as doesthe United States.
Recently, however, severalstudies have produced seriesof top income
shares using tax returndata. Although these studiesdo not produce cor-
responding series of marginaltax rates, as I haveshown here, interesting
findings emerge.
First, enormous heterogeneityexists in the behaviorof top income
shares in recent decades acrosscountries. Some countries,such as the
United Kingdom (Atkinson,2002) or Canada (Saez andVeall, 2003) have
experienced notable increasesin top income shares,although these
increases have not been aspronounced as in the United States.In contrast,
countries from continentalEurope, such as France(Piketty, 2003), the
Netherlands (Atkinson andSalverda, 2003), andSwitzerland (Dell,
Piketty, and Saez, 2003),have experienced eitherdecline or little change in
top income sharessince 1960.
Second, the U.K. experience seemsto be the closest tothe U.S. experi-
ence. Top incomeshares in the UnitedKingdom started increasingexactly
in 1979, when the toprate declined from 98 to75 percent, although the
concomitant increase seemsmodest relative to the sizeof the net-of-tax
60 It is quite telling to read in the recent surveyof Hall and Murphy (2003), twoprominent
and conservative researchers inthis field, that their bestexplanation for the surge in stock-
option compensation wasthat "boards and managersfalsely perceive stock options to be
inexpensive because of accountingand cash-flow considerations."170Saez
increase at the top.61 In 1988,the top rate was further decreasedto 40 per- cent and has not changed since then.In contrast to the United States,how- ever, the increase in top share has beenrelatively smooth since 1979,with no break around the tax changes. Studyingthe composition and estimat- ing precisely the marginaltax rates faced by top U.K.income-taxpayers seems to be a priority in understandingwhether the recent increasein top incomes is due to the taxdevelopments.62
Third, Canada hasexperienced a surge in top incomessignificantly larger than the increase inthe United Kingdom (althoughsmaller than that in the United States)and, as in the United States,this increase has been due to a dramaticincrease in top salaries since theearly 1980s. In contrast to the United States, however,top incomes in Canada havenot experienced, large tax cuts sincethe l960s.63 Thus, the dramaticincrease in top incomes in Canadacannot be attributed solely to fiscaldevelop-
ments in Canada. Saez and Veall (2003)argue that the threat of emigration
to the United States has forcedCanadian companies to increasethe pay of their top employees if theywant to retain them, therebyreplicating in Canada the dramatic U.S. increasein top employees'pay. If the migration
explanation is correct, it implies thatthe surge in topwage incomes in the United States is a real phenomenonand not a uniqueconsequence of the repackaging of income to avoidtaxes.
Last, France, the Netherlands,and Switzerland haveexperienced rela- tively small changes in theirtop tax rates, in contrast to theUnited States and the United Kingdom. Piketty(1999) shows that the smallchanges in the French top tax ratesgenerated small shorttermresponses from top income taxpayers but that thoseresponses do not seem to persistover time. Switzerland has lowertop-income tax rates than does theUnited States (around 35percent when adding federal,cantonal, and local income taxes), but has muchlower top income sharesthan does the United States (the top 1percent share was around 8-9percent in the l990s, while it was between 13and 17 percent in the UnitedStates). In sum, high income taxrates do not seem to account forthe differences in top income sharesacross countries, although it ismore debatable whether they can account fora substantial part of the time-seriespattern within countries. Therefore,a systematic analysis of top incomesin countries
61It might be the case, however, thatfor the top .1 percent incomes, theaverage decline in marginal tax rates has been muchmore modest.
62Dilnot and Kell (1988) try to analyzethis issue but have access onlyto a single year of micro tax returns and have to relyon aggregate numbers for their time-seriesanalysis.
63The top income tax rate in Canada,including provincial taxes,was about 50 percent in 2000.Reported Incomes and MarginalTax Rates, 1960-2000171
that have experienceddrastic cuts in top incometax rates in recent
decades, as in theUnited States and the UnitedKingdom, would be of
most interest. Thoseresults could teach us whether adramatic cut in top
rates is necessarilyassociated with a rise in topincomes.
REFERENCES
Atkinson, Anthony(2002). "Top Incomes in theUnited Kingdom over the
Twentieth Century." NuffieldCollege, Oxford. Mimeo.
Atkinson, Anthony,and Wiemer Salverda(2003). "Top Incomes inthe
Netherlands and the UnitedKingdom over the TwentiethCentury." Nuffield
College, Oxford. Ivlimeo.
Auerbach, Alan (1988)."Capital Gains Taxation in theUnited States." Brookings
Papers on EconomicActivity 2:595-631.
Auten, Gerald, andRobert Carroll (1999) "TheEffect of Income Taxes on
Household Behavior." Reviewof Economics and Statistics81(4):681-693.
Bertrand, Marianne, EstherDuflo, and SendhilMullainathan (2002). "How
Much Should We TrustDifferencesinDifferees Estimates?"NBER Working
Paper no. 8841. March.Forth-coming in Quarterly Journalof Economics. 119(1),
2004.
Carroll, Robert (1998). "TaxRates, Taxpayer Behavior,and the 1993 Tax Act."
Office of Tax Analysis,U.S. Department of theTreasury. Working paper.
November Number 79.
Carroll, Robert, and DavidJoulfaian (1997). "Taxesand Corporate Choice of
Organizational Form." Office of TaxAnalysis, U.S. Department of theTreasury.
Working Paper no. 73.October.
Dell, Fabien, ThomasPiketty, and Emmanuel Saez(2003). "The Evolution of
Income and WealthConcentration in Switzerland overthe 20th Century."
University of California. Mimeo.
Dilnot, Andrew, andMichael Kell (1988). "Top-RateTax Cuts and Incentives:
Some Empirical Evidence."Fiscal Studies 9:70-92.
Eissa, Nada (1995)."Taxation and Labor Supplyof Married Women: The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 as aNatural Experiment." NBERWorking Paper no. 5023.
February.
Eissa, Nada, and JeffreyLiebman (1996). "Labor SupplyResponse to the Earned
Income Tax Credit."Quarterly Journal of Economics111:605-637.
Feenberg, Daniel, andElisabeth Coutts (1993). "AnIntroduction to the TA)(SIM
Model." Journal of Policy Analysisand Management 12(1):189-194.
Feenberg, Daniel, and JamesPoterba (1993). "Income Inequalityand the Incomes
of Very High Income Taxpayers:Evidence from Tax Returns."Tax Policy and the
Economy 7:145-177.
Feenberg, Daniel, and JamesPoterba (2000). "The Incomeand Tax Share of Very
High Income Households,1960-1995". American EconomicReview 90(2):264-270.
Feldstein, Martin (1995)."The Effect of Marginal TaxRates on Taxable Income:
A Panel Study ofthe 1986 Tax Reform Act."Journal of Political Economy
103(3):551-572.
Feldstein, Martin (1999). "TaxAvoidance and the DeadweightLoss of the Income
Tax". Review of Economicsand Statistics 81(4):674-680.172Saez
Feldstein, Martin, and Daniel Feenberg(1996). "The Effect of IncreasedTax Rates on Taxable Income and Economic Efficiency:A Preliminary Analysis of the1993 Tax Rate Increases". Tax Policyand the Economy 10:89-117.
Goolsbee, Austan (1999). "Evidenceon the High-Income Laffer Curve fromSix Decades of Tax Reform." BrookingsPapers on Economic Activity2:1-47. Goolsbee, Austan (2000a). "It'sNot About the Money: Why NaturalExperiments Don't Work on the Rich." InDoes Atlas Shrug? The EconomicConsequences of Taxing the Rich, J. Slemrod (ed.).Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress. Goolsbee, Austan (2000b)."What Happens When You Taxthe Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation."Journal of Political Economy108(2):352-378. Gordon, Roger, and Joel Slemrod(2000). "Are 'Real' Responsesto Taxes Simply Income Shifting Between Corporateand Personal Tax Bases?" InDoes Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequencesof Thxing the Rich, J. Slemrod(ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.Press.
Gruber, Jonathan, and EmmanuelSaez (2002). "The Elasticityof Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications." Journalof Public Economics 84:1-32.
Hall, Brian, and Kevin Murphy(2003). "The Trouble with StockOptions". NBER Working Paper no. 9784. June.
Katz, Lawrence, and David Autor(1999). "Changes in the WageStructure and Earnings Inequality." In Handbookof Labor Economics, Volume 3A,0. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.). Amsterdam:North-Holland.
Kopczuk, Wojciech (2003). "TaxBases, Tax Rates and the Elasticityof Reported Income," NBER Working Paperno. 10044. October.
Liebman, Jeffrey, and RichardZeckhauser (2003). "Schmeduling".Harvard University. Mimeo.
Lindsey, Lawrence (1987)."Individual Taxpayer Responseto Tax Cuts: 1982-1984, with Implications for the RevenueMaximizing Tax Rate." Journal ofPublic Economics 33:173-206.
Lindsey, Lawrence (1990). TheGrowth Experiment: How theNew Tax Policy Is Transforming the U.S. Economy. NewYork: Basic Books, Inc.
Meyer, Bruce, and Daniel Rosenbaum(2001). "Welfare, the EarnedIncome Tax Credit, and the Labor Supplyof Single Mothers." QuarterlyJournal of Economics 116(3):1063-1114
Mirrlees, James A. (1971). "AnExploration in the Theory ofOptimal Income Taxation." Review of Economic Studies38:175-208.
Murphy, Kevin J.(1999). "Executive Compensation."In Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3B, 0. Ashenfelterand D. Card (eds.). Amsterdam:North- Holland.
Piketty Thomas (1999). "Les HautsRevenus Face aux Modificationsdes Taux Marginaux Supérieurs de l'Impôtsur le Revenu en France, 1970-1996."
Economie et Prevision 138-139:25-60
Piketty, Thomas (2003). "IncomeInequality in France, 1901-1998."Journal of Political Economy 111(5):1004-1042.
Piketty Thomas, and EmmanuelSaez (2003). "Income Inequalityin the United States, 1913-1998." QuarterlyJournal of Economics 118(1):1-39.Series updated to year 2000 at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8467(accessed March, 2003). Saez, Emmanuel (2001). "UsingElasticities to Derive OptimalIncome Tax Rates." Review of Economic Studies68:205-229.
Saez, Emmanuel (2002). "DoTaxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?"University of California. Mimeo.Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates,1960-2000173
Saez, Emmanuel (2003). "TheEffect of Marginal Tax Rates on Income:A Panel
Study of 'Bracket Creep'." Journalof Public EconomicS 87:1231-1258.
Saez, Emmanuel (2004)."Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates,1960-2000:
Evidence and Policy Implications."NBER Working Paper no. 10273 February.
Saez, Emmanuel, and MichaelVeal! (2003). "The Evolution of HighIncomes in
Canada, 1920-2000." NBER WorkingPaper no. 9607. April.
Sammartino, Frank, and David Weiner(1997). "Recent Evidence onTaxpayers'
Response to the Rate Increasesin the 1990s." National Tax Journal50(3):683-705.
Samwick, Andrew (1996). "Tax Sheltersand Passive Losses After the Tax Reform
Act of 1986." In EmpiricalFoundations of Household Taxation, M.Feldstein and J.
Poterba (eds.). Chicago, IL: Universityof Chicago Press.
Scholes, Myron, and Mark A.Wolfson (1992). Taxes and BusinessStrategy:
A Planning Approach. New York:Prentice Hall.
Slemrod, Joel (1994). "On the HighIncome Laffer Curve." In TaxProgressivity and
Income Inequality, J. Slemrod (ed.).Cambridge, England: Cambridge University
Press, 177-210.
Slemrod, Joel (1995). "Income Creation orIncome Shifting? Behavioral Responses
to the Tax Reform Actof 1986." American Economic Review85(2):175-180.
Slemrod, Joel (1996). "High IncomeFamilies and the Tax Changes of the1980s:
The Anatomy of BehavioralResponse." In Empirical Foundationsof Household
Taxation, M. Feldstein and J. Poterba(eds.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Slemrod, Joel (1998). "MethodologicalIssues in Measuring and Interpreting
Taxable Income Elasticities."National Tax Journal 51(4):773-788.
Slemrod, Joel, and Jonathan Bakija(2001). "Growing Inequality andDecreased
Tax Progressivity." InInequality and Tax Policy, K. Hassett (ed.).Washington DC:
American Enterprise Institute Press.
Slemrod, Joel, and Wojciech Kopczuk(2002). "The Optimal Elasticity ofTaxable
Income." Journal of Public Economics84(1):91-112.
Stewart, Kenneth J., and StephenB. Reed (1999). "CPI Research SeriesUsing
Current Methods, 1978-98."Monthly Labor Review 122(6):29-38.